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The levy of service charge in India is at present highly contented, which has led to a war ofwords among various authorities of the country.
y. This paperinvestigatesthree scenarios through an economical lens and within the boundaries of the consumer rights. The pros of the three scenarios are then weighed against its cons to reach a final recommendation of the study which in turn also proves all the three scenarios which are contended in the country at present as economically inefficient. The findings of the study show that the first scenario of tipping is proved inefficient asIndia does not have a strong tipping culture leading to undertipping, along with that tips are only realised to the front-end workers and not the back-end workers or the cleaning staff.
Niharika Agarwal and Diya Parikh (2025) "Law and Economic Analysis of Service Charge in Restaurants ", GNLU Journal of Law And Economics : Volume VI 2023, Issue I
Available at:
https://gnlu.ac.in/GJLE/Publications/Law and Economic Analysis of Service Charge in Restaurants
The essay examines the violence that unfurled in Bangladesh in 2024 from the lens of the relativedeprivation theory to explain the role of perceived inequality in political violence, and the prospecttheory to explain the role of prospect losses as a motivation for individuals to participate inpolitical violence. The essay analyses the events that acted as a trigger for the social unrest andfocuses on the contentious quota to explain the decisionmaking process of the players involved,from the viewpoint of the prospect theory. The essay also looks at macroeconomic variables suchas youth unemployment, inflation etc. during both the years that marked a social unrest among thegeneral population and found that in both years, the economy had shown worrying trends. Theessay also looks at the role of costs and benefits as perceived by an individual while making achoice in a risky situation. The conceptual framework is further demonstrated by a game wherethe decisionmaking process of the government, as a player, is discussed. It is found that theequilibrium for both the players is at the first outcome, where the participation is met withsuppression by the government. The most ideal outcome for both the parties is a peaceful approachto the issue at hand. Based on the existing research, and the game theory, policy recommendationshave been formulated emphasizing the need for a stronger penal system, to augment the costs thatare associated with participation in violence, and to make infrastructural developments to addressthe socioeconomic issues at hand. The establishment of transparent communication channelswould also go a long way in mitigating the risks of future unrest.